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South Africa has 291 functional estuaries of which 43 per cent 
are threatened. These estuaries provide numerous 
environmental goods and services to the species situated within 
and adjacent to them. In an effort to improve the protection of 
the country's estuaries and the environmental goods and 
services they provide, many laws of direct and indirect relevance 
to estuaries have been introduced over the past two decades. 
The provision of these environmental goods and services is 
contingent, however, upon maintaining the natural ecological 
flows inherent in estuaries. One significant threat to maintaining 
these natural ecological flows is the artificial opening of the 
mouth of an estuary, an action often triggered by the desire to 
protect private property against flooding when estuarine water 
levels rise. Decisions to artificially open the mouth of an estuary 
often therefore need to achieve a difficult balance between 
ecological (generally public) interests and proprietary (generally 
private) interests, a balance which should ideally be informed by 
the numerous laws, and their associated plans and policies, of 
direct relevance to protecting and managing estuaries. The 
courts have recently been called upon to resolve disputes 
regarding decisions about whether or not to artificially open the 
mouth of an estuary, and what one recent decision of the 
Supreme Court of Appeal in Abbott v Overstrand Municipality   
2016 JOL 35969 (SCA) clearly illustrates is that there are not 
only significant challenges in the implementation of the legal 
framework of direct relevance to estuaries, but also in the 
judiciary's understanding and application thereof. It furthermore 
illustrates distinct anomalies in the interpretation of the original, 
assigned and incidental executive authority of local government 
in relation to environmental matters, and that notwithstanding a 
swathe of recent relevant jurisprudence in this regard, confusion 
still abounds in this environmental governance quagmire.  
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1 Introduction 
Estuaries provide essential environmental goods and services to species 
inhabiting the coast, an area facing increasing pressure from particular 
human migration to and the associated development of the often narrow 
and ecologically sensitive strip lying on the terrestrial and marine divide. 
These environmental goods and services include nesting and feeding 
habitats for aquatic plants and animals, stopovers for migratory birds, 
nursery areas for fish, storm surge management, flood water control, the 
provision of raw building materials and food, sediment and pollutant 
filtration, and recreational opportunities to those inhabiting the area. The 
provision of these environmental goods and services is dependent on 
maintaining the natural ecological flows in estuaries – "the amount of water 
required for the aquatic ecosystem to continue to thrive and provide the 
services humans and other species rely upon".1 
One key threat to maintaining these ecological flows is human manipulation 
of water levels through artificially opening the mouth of an estuary to the 
sea. This generally occurs through mechanically slicing a channel through 
the sand berm, a raised barrier of sand which is naturally seasonally 
deposited at the mouth of an estuary thereby temporarily cutting off its 
connection to the sea. Decisions relating to when, where and at what water 
level to allow for the artificial opening of the mouth of an estuary should be 
informed by the consideration of several factors relating to sedimentation,2 
                                            
* Alexander Paterson. BSocSci LLB LLM PHD (UCT). Professor, Institute of Marine 
and Environmental Law, Faculty of Law, University of Cape Town. Email: 
Alexander.Paterson@uct.ac.za. 
1  European Commission Ecological Flows 9. 
2  Breaching the sand berm at higher water levels improves the scouring effect when 
the water rushes from the estuary into the sea. It improves the removal of 
sedimentation and deepens the natural channels of the estuary. Breaching the sand 
berm at lower water levels has the opposite effect. See Beck and Basson 2008 Water 
SA 33-38. 
A PATERSON  PER / PELJ 2018 (21)  3 
salinity,3 water quality4 and water levels.5 An integrated consideration of 
these factors improves the potential for the final decision to achieve a 
balance between ecological (generally public) interests and proprietary 
(generally private) interests. However, it would appear that it is often the last 
of the above factors, and particularly where rising water levels in an estuary 
threaten private proprietary interests, which has historically held sway in the 
decision-making process, with damaging consequences to several of South 
Africa's estuaries. 
South Africa has 291 functional estuaries of which 43 per cent are 
threatened, 30 per cent critically so.6 Only 33 per cent of the country's 
estuaries are well protected and 59 per cent are apparently subject to no 
protection at all.7 The condition of the country's estuaries continues to 
deteriorate and according to the National Estuarine Management Protocol 
published in 2013, "(h)uman impact activities need to be regulated and 
managed for estuaries to be adequately conserved and sustainably 
utilised".8 These activities would include artificially opening the mouth of an 
estuary thereby manipulating its natural ecological flow.  
The past two decades have seen the introduction of numerous laws of 
direct9 and indirect10 relevance to regulating and managing South Africa's 
estuaries. Those of direct relevance are principally the National Water Act11 
(hereafter the NWA) and the National Environmental Management: 
                                            
3  Breaching the sand berm allows seawater into the estuary, thereby changing the 
salinity levels of its waters. Too high salinity levels can have negative impacts on 
fauna and flora in the estuary. See Anchor Environmental Determination of the 
Ecological Water Requirements for the Klein Estuary v-vi. 
4  Breaching the sand berm can improve the water quality of the estuary by allowing 
polluted water to flow into the sea, with the flow simultaneously improving oxygen 
levels in the estuary's waters. This pollution can be caused by high ecoli levels 
(where untreated sewage drains into the estuary), inorganic nutrients (where residue 
nitrogen-based fertilisers used by farmers in the region drain into the estuary) and 
other toxic substances (where residue herbicides and pesticides similarly used by 
farmers in the area drain into the estuarine waters). See Anchor Environmental 
Determination of the Ecological Water Requirements for the Klein Estuary vi. 
5  Breaching the sand berm will naturally result in a reduction of water levels in the 
estuary as the estuarine water flows into the sea. See Beck and Basson 2008 Water 
SA 33-38. 
6  Driver et al National Biodiversity Assessment 8. 
7  GN 341 in GG 36432 of 10 May 2013 1. 
8  GN 341 in GG 36432 of 10 May 2013 1. 
9  These laws contain provisions specifically directed at regulating estuaries or the 
water resources contained within them. 
10  While not containing provisions specifically directed at regulating estuaries or the 
water resources contained within them, these laws do contain provisions of indirect 
relevance to both. 
11  National Water Act 36 of 1998 (the NWA). 
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Integrated Coastal Management Act12 (hereafter NEMICMA). The NWA 
governs the country's "water resources", which are specifically defined to 
include estuaries.13 While the entire contents of the NWA are accordingly of 
direct relevance to estuaries, those of specific relevance to managing the 
natural ecological flows in estuaries include the following: prescription of 
resource quality objectives;14 reserve determinations;15 catchment 
management strategies;16 and the duty of care.17 NEMICMA in turn governs 
the "coastal zone", defined to include "coastal waters", which are in turn 
defined to include estuaries.18 Again, while the entire contents of the 
NEMICMA are accordingly of direct relevance to estuaries, those of key 
relevance to managing the natural ecological flows within them include the 
following: national estuarine management protocol;19 estuarine 
                                            
12  National Environmental Management: Integrated Coastal Management Act 24 of 
2008 (the NEMICMA). 
13  Section 1 of the NWA. 
14  Chapter 3 (parts 1 and 2) of the NWA. The Minister of Water and Sanitation must 
determine the class and resource quality objectives (hereafter RQOs) for all 
significant water resources, with resource quality referring to water quantity, water 
quality and the condition of the riparian habitat. Once determined, the class and 
RQOs are binding on all authorities exercising functions under the Act. 
15  Chapter 3 (part 3) of the NWA. The Minister of Water and Sanitation must determine 
the reserve for all significant water resources. The reserve comprises of two 
components, a basic human needs component (which provides for the essential 
needs of individuals served by the water resource) and an ecological component 
(which relates to the water required to protect the aquatic ecosystems of the water 
resource). The reserve refers to both the quantity and quality of the water in the 
resource. The Minister must have determined the reserve before authorising the use 
of any water in a particular water resource (such as granting water use licences) with 
the reserve trumping all other forms of water use. 
16  Chapter 2 (part 2) of the NWA. The country is divided into nine water management 
areas (hereafter WMAs). The Act provides for the establishment of a catchment 
management agency (hereafter CMA) for each of these WMAs. The CMA must 
develop a catchment management strategy (hereafter CMS) for the water resources 
within its WMA. The CMS must integrate the relevant RQO and reserve 
determinations for all significant water resources falling within the WMA and is 
binding on all decisions of the CMA. 
17  Section 19 of the NWA. The NWA imposed a duty on any person who owns, controls, 
occupies or uses land to take measures to prevent the pollution of water resources 
situated on it. "Pollution" is very broadly defined in the Act and includes the "direct 
or indirect alteration of the physical, chemical or biological properties of a water 
resource so as to make it: (a) less fit for any beneficial purpose for which it may 
reasonably be expected to be used; or (b) harmful or potentially harmful – (aa) to the 
welfare, health or safety of human beings; (bb) to any aquatic or nonaquatic 
organisms; (cc) to the resource quality; or (dd) to property" (s 1). If these measures 
are not taken, the relevant CMA may itself do whatever is necessary to prevent the 
pollution or to remedy its effects, and to recover all reasonable costs from the 
persons responsible for the pollution. Artificially opening the mouth of an estuary 
could feasibly constitute "pollution". 
18  Section 1 of NEMICMA. 
19  Chapter 4 of NEMICMA. The Minister of Environmental Affairs with the concurrence 
of the Minister of Water and Sanitation must publish a national estuarine 
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management plans;20 coastal committees;21 coastal management 
programmes;22 coastal management lines;23 and the concept of state 
trusteeship.24 The above specific provisions contained in the NWA and 
NEMICMA are complemented by a diverse array of provisions contained in 
laws of indirect relevance to estuaries including the following: the National 
Environmental Management Act25 (hereafter NEMA); the Environment 
Conservation Act26 (hereafter ECA); the National Environmental 
                                            
management protocol which provides the national strategic vision and objectives, 
management standards, procedures and guidelines on how to manage estuaries 
and who is responsible for doing so. It must also contain details regarding estuarine 
management plans to be adopted for each of South Africa's estuaries, specifically 
who must adopt them and what they should contain. The National Estuarine 
Management Protocol was published in 2013 (GN 341 in GG 36432 of 10 May 2013). 
20  In terms of the National Estuarine Management Protocol (GN 341 in GG 36432 of 
10 May 2013), a broad array of authorities, including coastal municipalities, must 
adopt estuarine management plans for each estuary falling within their jurisdiction. 
The estuarine management plan constitutes the primary plan for managing the 
estuary and should contain a local vision, management objectives, water quantity 
and quality objectives, an integrated monitoring plan, performance indicators, and 
an overview of institution tasked with implementing the plan. 
21  Chapter 5 of the NEMICMA. Provision is made for the establishment of coastal 
committees in all three spheres of government to promote integrated coastal 
management, which would include the regulation and management of estuaries. 
22  Chapter 6 of the NEMICMA. Provision is made for the national government, coastal 
provinces and municipalities to develop a coastal management programme which 
effectively constitutes the relevant coastal policy for their respective jurisdictional 
areas. They should accordingly guide decision-making in relation to the regulation 
and management of estuaries falling within their jurisdiction. Local authorities are 
empowered to make by-laws to give effect to their municipal coastal management 
programme. 
23  Section 25 of the NEMICMA. Relevant coastal provincial Ministers must establish 
coastal management lines inter alia to protect coastal public property, private 
property and public safety, to protect the coastal protection zone, and to preserve 
the aesthetic values of the coastal zone. Once delineated, the provincial Minister can 
prohibit or restrict the construction of structures that are wholly/partially seaward of 
the line; and municipalities must reflect the coastal management lines in the zoning 
schemes they administer. 
24  Section 3, read together with ss 1, 7 and 12 of the NEMICMA. The state, operating 
through its institutions and functionaries tasked with implementing the Act (which 
would include municipalities), must act as the trustees of the "coastal zone" (with 
estuaries falling within this concept). Cumulatively, they must ensure that it is used, 
managed and conserved "in the interests of the whole community", a term defined 
to include the interests of human and "other living organisms" that are dependent on 
the coastal environment.  
25  National Environmental Management Act 108 of 1998 (the NEMA). Given its 
framework nature, all the provisions in the NEMA are relevant to regulating and 
managing estuaries. Those of key interest include the national environmental 
management principles (s 2), integrated environmental management (ch 5) and 
compliance and enforcement (ch 7). 
26  Environment Conservation Act 73 of 1989 (the ECA). The provisions governing 
limited development areas (s 23) and directives (s 31A) may in certain circumstances 
be relevant to regulating and managing estuaries. 
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Management: Biodiversity Act27 (hereafter NEMBA); the National 
Environmental Management: Protected Areas Act28 (hereafter NEMPAA); 
the Sea-Shore Act29 (hereafter SSA); the Marine Living Resources Act30 
(hereafter MLRA); the Spatial Planning and Land Use Management Act31 
(hereafter SPLUMA); the Western Cape Land Use Planning Act32 (hereafter 
WCLUPA); and the Nature Conservation Ordinance (Cape)33 (hereafter 
NCO (Cape)).  
The objective here is not to provide a treatise on South African law of 
relevance to estuaries, but rather merely to highlight the fact that over the 
past two decades the country has introduced a broad array of laws of direct 
and indirect relevance to regulating and managing the natural ecological 
flows in estuaries. The rationale for doing so will be revealed towards the 
end of this note on Abbott v Overstrand Municipality.34 The matter was 
initially heard by the Western Cape High Court in 2013, and was 
subsequently taken on appeal by the applicant to the Supreme Court of 
Appeal, which handed down its judgment in May 2016. The dispute centred 
                                            
27  National Environmental Management: Biodiversity Act 10 of 2004 (the NEMBA). The 
provisions dealing with biodiversity planning and monitoring (ch 3), threatened and 
protected ecosystems and species (ch 4), and alien and invasive species (ch 5) may 
in certain circumstances be relevant to regulating and managing estuaries. 
28  National Environmental Management: Protected Areas Act 57 of 2003 (the 
NEMPAA). Where an estuary falls within the borders of a protected area, the 
NEMPAA in its entirety is relevant to regulating and managing the estuary. 
29  Sea-Shore Act 21 of 1935 (the SSA). While the SSA was repealed by the NEMICMA 
with effect from 8 December 2015 (Proc 5 in GG 39657 of 5 February 2015), by-laws 
promulgated by municipalities under the SSA governing the sea and seashore 
(which area extends to include estuaries) are specifically saved (ss 98-99).  
30  Marine Living Resources Act 18 of 1998 (the MLRA). In so far as the MLRA extends 
to governing the fishing of marine living resources situated on/in the seashore and 
internal waters, it may in certain circumstances be relevant to regulating and 
managing estuaries. 
31  Spatial Planning and Land Use Management Act 16 of 2013 (the SPLUMA). The 
provisions dealing with spatial development frameworks (ch 4), land use 
management (ch 5) and land development management (ch 6) may in certain 
circumstances be relevant to regulating and managing estuaries. 
32  Western Cape Land Use Planning Act 3 of 2014 (WCLUPA). The provisions dealing 
with spatial planning (ch 3), municipal development management (ch 4), provincial 
development management (chapter 5), and land use planning principles (chapter 6) 
may in certain circumstances be relevant to regulating and managing estuaries. The 
same would be true for the other provincial planning ordinances and Acts. 
33  Nature Conservation Ordinance (Cape) 19 of 1974 (NCO (Cape)). In so far as the 
NCO (Cape) regulates the management of species of fauna and flora situated in 
internal waters (such as estuaries), it is relevant to regulating and managing 
estuaries themselves. The same would be true for the other provincial conservation 
ordinances and Acts. 
34  Abbott v Overstrand Municipality 2016 JOL 35969 (SCA) (hereafter Abbott (SCA)). 
The matter was initially heard in the Western Cape High Court (Abbott v Overstrand 
Municipality 2015 JOL 33188 (WCC) (hereafter Abbott (WCC)). 
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on a decision by the Overstrand Municipality not to artificially breach the 
mouth of an estuary despite Mr Abbott's allegation that a failure to do so 
would cause his house to be flooded and would thus interfere with his 
private property interests. The laws briefly canvassed above accordingly 
constituted the legal context within which the dispute should have been 
resolved. Before returning to consider this legal context and the manner in 
which the court grappled with it, it seems prudent to outline the factual 
scenario which gave rise to the dispute. 
2 The facts and arguments 
The Klein River Estuary (KRE) is situated on the Southern Cape Coast 
between the towns of Hermanus and Stanford. It is approximately 17 km 
long and can be divided into three main parts: the mouth (which stretches 3 
kilometres inland from the sea and comprises of a series of shallows and 
tidal channels); the vlei (which stretches from 3 to 8.5 kilometres inland from 
the mouth and comprises of a large unconstrained lagoon); and the river 
(which extends from 8.5 to 17.5 kilometres inland from the vlei and 
comprises of the narrow Klein River which feeds the estuary). 
Administratively it falls within the jurisdictional boundaries of the Western 
Cape Province, the Overberg-Breede Water Management Area, the 
Overberg District Municipality and the Overstrand Local Municipality. 
From a conservation perspective, the KRE is ranked fifth in importance of 
all temperate estuaries in South Africa35 and is a priority estuary for 
biodiversity conservation and the provision of ecological services, 
specifically as a nursery area linked to the recovery of economically 
important fish species.36 The quality and quantity of flows into the estuary 
are influenced by: water use for irrigation; agricultural and pastoral run-off 
containing fertilisers, pesticides and herbicides; effluent from Stanford; 
septic and conservancy tank seepage from developments on the banks of 
the estuary; and litter.37 Considerable predominantly residential 
development along the banks of the estuary falls below the 1:50 year flood 
line. These residential developments are seasonally threatened by flooding 
when the mouth of the estuary is closed to the sea by sand deposited to 
form a natural berm. 
                                            
35  Turpie and Clark Development of a Conservation Plan for Temperate South African 
Estuaries 26. 
36  CapeNature & iRAP Consulting Development of an Estuarine Management Plan for 
the Klein River 19. 
37  Anchor Environmental Determination of the Ecological Water Requirements for the 
Klein Estuary iv. 
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Since approximately 1860, the mouth of the KRE has from time to time been 
artificially breached where it does not naturally breach the sand berm. 
Natural breaching historically occurs where the water level of the KRE 
exceeds 3-3.5 metres above mean sea-level (MSL). Artificial breaching, 
which is undertaken at lesser water levels, causes major changes in the 
mouth condition, water levels, salinity distribution and water quality in the 
KRE.38 Where the KRE is artificially breached at lower than natural 
breaching water levels, it decreases the volume and duration of water flow 
out to sea, reduces sediment scouring, disrupts the long-term 
erosion/depositional cycles in the estuary, results in increased 
sedimentation in the lower estuary, and changes the estuary's abiotic state 
from a predominantly open marine system to a predominantly closed marine 
system.39  
Mr Abbott, the applicant in the matter, purchased a property on the Klein 
River (in the river component of the KRE) in 1982. In 1989 he constructed 
a house on the property and, following the completion of his building project, 
took up residence in the house. According to Mr Abbott, at the time he built 
his house, a municipal policy existed in terms of which the municipality 
agreed to artificially breach the sand berm when water levels in the KRE 
reached 2.1 metres above MSL, and to protect low-lying properties inter alia 
by erecting floodwalls when water levels in the vlei and river section of the 
KRE threatened to flood property.40 In 2009 the Klein River Estuary Forum 
was established as a non-statutory body comprising of representatives from 
relevant national, provincial and local government departments and local 
stakeholders. Following various studies and workshops, it adopted the 
Mouth Management Plan for the Klein River (the Management Plan) 
spanning the period 2010-2015. The statutory status of this Management 
Plan is unclear, as despite the court's indicating that it had been formally 
approved by the Western Cape's Department of Environmental Affairs and 
Development Planning,41 it is unclear under what legal framework it was so 
"approved". Notwithstanding, Mr Abbott alleged that two components of the 
Management Plan affected him negatively.42 Firstly, it indicated that artificial 
breaching of the sand berm of the KRE would not be contemplated at water 
levels less than 2.6 metres above MSL and that breaching at higher levels 
                                            
38  Anchor Environmental Determination of the Ecological Water Requirements for the 
Klein Estuary v. 
39  Anchor Environmental Determination of the Ecological Water Requirements for the 
Klein Estuary v. 
40  Abbott (WCC) para 13. 
41  Abbott (SCA) para 30. 
42  Abbott (WCC) para 17. 
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would be preferred. Secondly, it indicated that artificial breaching would not 
be undertaken in order to prevent the flooding of low-lying private or public 
properties. 
As a consequence, Mr Abbott alleged that since the adoption of the 
Management Plan in 2010 he had suffered repeated flooding of and 
structural damage to his property caused by the high water levels in the 
KRE. Mr Abbott sought over the next few years to lobby the Overstrand 
Municipality, the first respondent, to artificially breach the KRE at lower 
water levels than those reflected in the Management Plan, and to take steps 
to prevent his house from being flooded. Following the receipt of a letter 
from the Overstrand Municipality in August 2013 indicating that it had no 
intention of heeding his requests, Mr Abbott approached the Western Cape 
Division of the High Court for relief in July 2013. The main relief sought by 
Mr Abbot was the review and setting aside of the decision of the Overstrand 
Municipality to refuse to take steps to prevent damage being caused to his 
house by the flooding of the Klein River.43 He further requested the court to 
remit the matter to the Overstrand Municipality for reconsideration, which 
he requested should include a consideration of steps to prevent his house 
from being flooded, the flooding possibly being caused by their failure to 
artificially breach the KRE when water levels reached 2.1 metres above 
MSL.44 He did not accordingly seek an order directing the Overstrand 
Municipality to breach the berm, but only to take steps to protect his property 
from flooding, which could naturally include artificially breaching the berm. 
In the alternative, he sought an order: declaring that an established practice 
existed to artificially breach the berm of the KRE when low-lying properties 
were threatened with damage by high water levels in the KRE; declaring 
that the practice could be lawfully departed from only if the Overstrand 
Municipality took reasonable alternate steps to protect his house from being 
flooded; and directing the Overstrand Municipality to take such steps.45  
The Overstrand Municipality disputed most of Mr Abbott's allegations 
including: that Mr Abbott's property had not been flooded prior to 2010; that 
measures had previously been taken by it to protect properties in the river 
component of the KRE when water-levels reached a certain height due to 
the berm remaining closed; that Mr Abbott's house had been damaged by 
high water levels between 2010 and 2012; and that any damage caused to 
Mr Abbott's house by high water levels in 2013 in particular had something 
                                            
43  Abbott (WCC) para 6. 
44  Abbott (WCC) para 6. 
45  Abbott (WCC) para 7. 
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to do with its failure to artificially breach the berm.46 In addition, the 
Overstrand Municipality raised several additional defences.47 Firstly, it 
argued that that Mr Abbott had proceeded against the wrong respondent, 
bearing in mind that the Overstrand Municipality was only one of the 
members of the Klein River Estuary Forum, which was tasked with 
overseeing the management of the KRE, including making decisions about 
when, where and at what level to artificially breach the berm. Secondly, that 
Mr Abbott was the author of his own misfortune, having built his house within 
the one-in-50 year flood line of the Klein River. Thirdly, that Mr Abbott had 
changed the contour of the Klein River, effectively contributing to any 
flooding and damage he allegedly suffered.  
These latter defences largely fell by the wayside as the court a quo was 
faced at the outset with an apparent dispute of fact between Mr Abbott's 
version and that of the Overstrand Municipality, crucially relating to whether 
or not Mr Abbott had suffered damage to his property and whether this 
damage could be linked to the Municipality's decision to artificially breach 
the berm only at a higher water level. In the words of Blommaert AJ in the 
decision of the court a quo, "(i)t would seem to me that before the Applicant, 
as it were, gets out of the starting blocks, he has to prove that First 
Respondent's conduct, of which he complains, is the cause of his damage". 
The principal focus of the court a quo's decision accordingly related to the 
alleged damage suffered by Mr Abbott, the possible causal connection 
between this damage and the decision of the Overstrand Municipality not to 
artificially breach the mouth of the estuary, and how to deal with the 
apparent dispute of fact between Mr Abbott's version of events and that of 
the Overstrand Municipality in motion proceedings.  
3 The High Court decision – damage and the dispute of fact 
The court a quo proceeded by outlining the legal position relating to the 
dispute of fact in motion proceedings, restating the rule emanating from 
Plascon-Evans Paints Ltd v Van Riebeeck Paints (Pty) Ltd,48 as refined in 
Wightman t/a JW Construction v Headfour (Pty) Ltd.49 In summary, where 
an applicant seeks relief through motion proceedings and a dispute of fact 
arises, the court must accept the respondent's version unless the latter's 
allegations are, in the opinion of the court, either not such as to raise a real, 
                                            
46  These disputes of fact are scattered throughout the Abbottt (WCC) judgment and 
have been consolidated here in the interests of clarity.  
47  Abbott (WCC) para 21. 
48  Plascon-Evans Paints Ltd v Van Riebeeck Paints (Pty) Ltd 1984 3 SA 623 (AD). 
49  Wightman t/a JW Construction v Headfour (Pty) Ltd 2008 3 SA 371 (SCA). 
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genuine or bona fide dispute of fact, or are so farfetched or clearly untenable 
that the court is justified in rejecting them merely on the papers.50  
The court proceeded to trawl through the affidavits and supporting 
documentation submitted by Mr Abbott and the Overstrand Municipality to 
determine whether a dispute of fact had arisen. The key period in question 
was that running from 2010 (the year in which the Overstrand Municipality 
had adopted the Management Plan allegedly changing the policy regarding 
the water levels at which the estuary would be artificially breached) and 
2013 (the year when Mr Abbott approached the court for relief).51 The initial 
enquiry of the court was to determine whether Mr Abbott's property had in 
fact been flooded during this period, with the court considering each year in 
turn.  
According to documents presented to the court by the Overstrand 
Municipality, the estuary had been artificially breached on several occasions 
prior to 2010 when the water level in the estuary had exceeded that 
specified in the Management Plan, namely 2.6 metres above MSL.52 
Notwithstanding, and to some consternation of the court, Mr Abbott alleged 
that the flooding of his property had commenced only in 2010.53 In 2010 the 
area had suffered from a severe drought with water levels in the estuary 
remaining below 2.6 metres above MSL. While the mouth of the estuary had 
remained closed in 2010, the court concluded that it was very unlikely that 
Mr Abbott's property had been flooded in this year, given the historic water 
levels in the estuary prior to 2010, coupled with Mr Abbott's claim that the 
flooding of his property had occurred only since 2010.54 
As for 2011 and 2012, the Overstrand Municipality submitted documentation 
indicating that in both these years the estuary mouth had been artificially 
breached when water levels reached 2.78 metres above MSL. In his 
founding paper Mr Abbott had submitted photographs in support of his claim 
that his house had been flooded in 2011. He had furthermore submitted 
email correspondence with the Overstrand Municipality in support of his 
claim that his house had been flooded in 2012. The photographs, however, 
showed water close to the house and not in the house in 2011. The email 
correspondence referred to a threat of flooding were water levels to rise 
further in 2012, and not actual flooding. Furthermore, Mr Abbott had made 
                                            
50  Abbott (WCC) paras 26-27. 
51  Abbott (WCC) para 51. 
52  Abbott (WCC) para 45. 
53  Abbott (WCC) para 25. 
54  Abbott (WCC) para 54.2. 
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no mention of flooding when attending a meeting of the Klein River Estuary 
Forum in 2012 convened specifically to discuss the issue of artificially 
breaching the berm. On this basis the court expressed doubt that Mr 
Abbott's property had in fact been flooded in 2011 and 2012, 
notwithstanding water levels in the estuary rising to 2.78 metres above MSL. 
2013 saw significant rainfall in the Overstrand Municipality, which led to 
extensive flooding of the area. It was common cause that Mr Abbott's 
property had been flooded in this year, but at the time the flooding occurred 
the mouth of the estuary had been open to the sea. According to the court, 
this year could therefore be removed from the enquiry as even according to 
Mr Abbott's version of events, the Overstrand Municipality could not be held 
accountable for this flooding.55 
The court accordingly concluded that Mr Abbott had not conclusively shown 
that his property had indeed been flooded between 2010 and 2012.56 
Although not appearing necessary, the court did move to briefly consider 
the alleged link between the flooding of Mr Abbott's property and the shift in 
policy reflected in the Management Plan regarding the water level (being 
above 2.6 metres above MSL) at which the estuary would be artificially 
breached. Given that in several years prior to 2010 the estuary had been 
artificially breached at water levels exceeding 2.6 metres above MSL, years 
in which Mr Abbott had strangely not claimed to suffer any flooding, the court 
called into question the validity of Mr Abbott's allegations that the flooding 
between 2010 and 2012 could be linked to the shift in policy.57 The court 
was satisfied that the Overstrand Municipality had provided several 
reasons, accompanied by supporting documentation and expert reports, in 
response to Mr Abbott's allegations relating to the flooding and consequent 
damage to his property. In the court's mind, the reasons were neither 
"farfetched" nor "clearly untenable", and accompanied by the failure on the 
part of Mr Abbott to convincingly dispute the Overstrand Municipality's 
version, there was serious doubt as to what had in fact caused his alleged 
damage.58 
The court accordingly concluded that it was unable to decide the issue on 
the papers before it and moved to consider whether even in the absence of 
an application from Mr Abbott to refer the matter to oral evidence, it should 
                                            
55  Abbott (WCC) para 31 read with para 52. 
56  Abbott (WCC) para 55. 
57  Abbott (WCC) para 56. 
58  Abbott (WCC) paras 57-59. 
A PATERSON  PER / PELJ 2018 (21)  13 
mero motu do so.59 Taking heed of the guidance provided by Myburgh J in 
Joh-Air (Pty) Ltd v Rudman,60 the court decided not to do so.61 It accordingly 
held that Mr Abbott had not succeeded in getting out of the proverbial 
"starting blocks" and dismissed the application with costs,62 without one 
word of wisdom being passed on the application of the comprehensive 
contemporary legal framework of relevance to managing the ecological 
flows of estuaries. Mr Abbott, however, was granted leave to appeal.  
4 The Supreme Court decision – The issue of local 
government mandates over estuaries 
Mr Abbott's appeal was heard before the Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA) 
in May 2016. The relief sought by Mr Abbott and the Overstrand 
Municipality's response to his application were identical to that in the court 
a quo, and need not be repeated here. Notwithstanding this similarity and 
in agreement with the decision of the court a quo to dismiss the application, 
the SCA chose to follow a very different route in reaching its conclusion. 
Rather than focussing on the dispute of fact, the SCA deemed the starting 
point of the enquiry to be whether or not the municipality "had the legal 
obligation (and the necessary power) to take steps to protect the appellant's 
house from flooding".63 In doing so, and in the rather bizarre absence of Mr 
Abbott's having clearly distilled in his papers the specific review ground in 
terms of the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act64 on which he sought 
to found his review, the court inferred the review to be one in terms of 
section 6(2)(g). It accordingly held that to succeed in the application, Mr 
Abbott had to show that the Overstrand Municipality was under a legal 
obligation to take steps to prevent damage being caused to Mr Abbott's 
house by the flooding of the Klein River.65 As correctly identified by the SCA, 
the logical starting point for an enquiry of this nature was the Constitution of 
the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (hereafter the Constitution),66 and 
specifically the manner in which it allocates competence to the three 
spheres of government to make and administer laws over different issues. 
In a fleeting consideration of some relevant provisions contained in the 
                                            
59  Abbott (WCC) para 61. 
60  Joh-Air (Pty) Ltd v Rudman 1980 2 SA 420 (T). 
61  Abbott (WCC) paras 62-67. 
62  Abbott (WCC) paras 68-69. 
63  Abbott (SCA) paras 13-14. 
64  Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000. 
65  Abbott (SCA) para 13. 
66  Abbott (SCA) para 14. 
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Constitution,67 and with no consideration of contemporary jurisprudence 
canvassing the "environmental" mandate of local government,68 the SCA 
concluded that the Constitution did not "confer any authority on the 
municipality in relation to the breaching of the berm in the estuary and the 
protection of riparian property owners against flooding".69 According to the 
SCA, any such authority vested in the national and provincial spheres of 
government, owing to their concurrent competence over the "environment" 
and "nature conservation".70 The SCA therefore concluded that any powers 
which the Overstrand Municipality may have wished to exercise with regard 
to the KRE must have been assigned to it by national and provincial 
legislation.71  
The SCA went on to undertake a brief survey of a few laws in order to justify 
its conclusion, namely the NEMA, the NEMICMA and the NCO (Cape). In 
respect of the NEMA, the SCA simply referred to the provisions dealing with 
integrated environmental management, concluding that the authority to 
issue environmental authorisations fell to national and provincial, and not 
local authorities.72 In respect of the NEMICMA, the SCA acknowledged the 
potential for it to authorise local authorities to "administer" estuaries 
particularly through the development and preparation of individual estuarine 
management plans, where they agree and have the capacity to do so, but 
indicated that this potential was yet to be realised.73 Finally, in respect of the 
NCO (Cape), the SCA held that while it did contain provisions relevant to 
managing estuaries, these fell under the purview of CapeNature, the 
provincial conservation agency, and not local authorities.74 
Mr Abbott sought to found authority on the part of the Overstrand 
Municipality to manage the KRE on two additional sources, both of which 
were dismissed by the SCA. First, he sought to rely on a council resolution 
passed by the erstwhile Hermanus Municipality in 1991, following the 
receipt of a request from the provincial conservation agency to manage the 
KRE. According to Mr Abbott, the council resolution indicated that the 
Hermanus Municipality resolved to accept full control over the KRE. This 
                                            
67  The SCA limited its consideration to s 156(1) read together with schedules 4 & 5 of 
the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (the Constitution). 
68  This jurisprudence is referred to in the commentary undertaken in part 5 of this note 
below. 
69  Abbott (SCA) para 15. 
70  Abbott (SCA) para 15. 
71  Abbott (SCA) para 16. 
72  Abbott (SCA) para 17. 
73  Abbott (SCA) para 19. 
74  Abbott (SCA) para 18. 
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was, however, conditional upon the provincial conservation authority 
defining these powers and responsibilities. According to the SCA, the latter 
condition was never met, and the erstwhile Hermanus Municipality never 
assumed sole responsibility for managing the KRE.75 Furthermore, the SCA 
held that Mr Abbott's contention failed to acknowledge the significant 
reallocation of public power and responsibility following the adoption of the 
Constitution in 1996.76 Secondly, Mr Abbott sought to found municipal 
authority over the KRE on regulations published by the erstwhile Overberg 
Regional Services Council in 1994 under the SSA. The SCA similarly 
dismissed this argument given that these fell under the purview of the 
Overberg District Municipality and not the Overstrand Local Municipality, 
and furthermore owing to the fact that the regulations contained an express 
prohibition on artificially opening the mouth of the KRE.77 
The SCA concluded that no "power or duty to manage or control the estuary 
and to take measures to protect riparian properties" had been assigned to 
the Overstrand Municipality by national or provincial legislation.78 It 
therefore held that the Overstrand Municipality had no obligation to take 
steps to protect Mr Abbott's house from flooding by the Klein River.79 
Acknowledging that it was not necessary to do so, the SCA nevertheless 
did briefly highlight several of the factual anomalies present in Mr Abbott's 
application, namely: whether his property had in fact been flooded; whether 
this flooding had been continuous/repeated or rather an isolated incident; 
whether this flooding could be linked in any way to different water levels 
triggering decisions to artificially breach the berm; whether a historic 
practice had existed prior to 2010 to artificially breach the KRE when water 
levels reach 2.1 metres above MSL; whether any measures had in fact in 
the past been undertaken by the Overstrand Municipality to protect 
properties in the river section of the KRE due to rising water levels; and 
whether the Overstrand Municipality was the party solely responsible for 
managing the KRE, given that it was but one member of the Klein River 
Estuary Forum.80 Having done so, it confirmed that there was clearly a 
material dispute of fact on the papers as to the cause of the damage to Mr 
Abbott's house. The SCA held that the version of Overstrand Municipality, 
which was backed by expert opinion, that the cause of the flooding in 2013 
                                            
75  Abbott (SCA) para 20. 
76  Abbott (SCA) para 21. 
77  Abbott (SCA) para 23. 
78  Abbott (SCA) para 16. 
79  Abbott (SCA) para 24. 
80  Abbott (SCA) paras 25-30. 
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was the major flooding of the river as opposed to high water levels in the 
estuary and that the flooding would have occurred irrespective of whether 
the mouth of the estuary was open or closed, was not "far-fetched", 
"untenable" or "demonstrably and clearly unworthy of credence".81 It 
accordingly concluded that on this basis too, the review application "was 
doomed to failure".82 
The SCA then proceeded to deal with Mr Abbott's alternate cause of action, 
in which he sought to invoke the doctrine of legitimate expectation to secure 
a court order compelling the Overstrand Municipality to take reasonable 
steps to protect his property from flooding if it chose to depart from the 
alleged historic policy of artificially breaching the berm of the estuary at 2.1 
metres above MSL. Why the court felt the need to do so is rather puzzling, 
given that the material dispute of fact canvassed above included the issue 
of whether the alleged practice and policy on which Mr Abbott sought to 
base his legitimate expectation existed in fact. Nonetheless, the SCA was 
easily able to dispense with the applicant's alternate cause of action on the 
basis that he had sought to invoke the doctrine of substantive legitimate 
expectation,83 which the court confirmed was yet to be recognised as part 
of South African law.84 Perhaps in an effort to preclude Mr Abbott from 
bringing further litigation on this particular point of law, the SCA highlighted 
that even were the doctrine of substantive legitimate expectation to be 
recognised, Mr Abbott's application would not have succeeded due to the 
dispute of fact discussed above.85 Mr Abbott's appeal was accordingly 
dismissed with costs, which included the costs consequent upon the 
employment of two counsel. 
5 Commentary 
While the outcome of the case appears to have constituted a triumph for 
public ecological interests (to preserve and not artificially manipulate the 
ecological flows of the estuary) over individual proprietary interests (to 
protect Mr Abbott's house from flooding), the decision of the SCA in 
particular raises some distinct questions. 
                                            
81  Abbott (SCA) para 31. 
82  Abbott (SCA) para 31. 
83  Mr Abbott was seeking substantive relief in the form of an order directing the 
Overstrand Municipality to take reasonable steps to protect his house, as opposed 
to merely procedural relief in the form of a right to a hearing prior to a legitimate 
expectation's being disappointed. 
84  Abbott (SCA) paras 32-33. 
85  Abbott (SCA) para 34.  
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As highlighted above, the starting point for the SCA in resolving the matter 
was an enquiry into whether or not the Overstrand Municipality had a legal 
obligation and the necessary power to take steps to protect Mr Abbott's 
house from being damaged due to flooding. The SCA turned to the 
Constitution to resolve this enquiry, indeed a logical place to start, but the 
cursory manner in which it dealt with the issue, the relevant legal framework, 
the complex jurisprudence and rich academic commentary thereon is 
somewhat disappointing. The enquiry appears to have warranted far more 
rigorous attention, attention which may have led the SCA to a different 
conclusion, ironically leading to private proprietary interests trumping public 
ecological interests. 
At the centre of the issue canvassed by the SCA was the executive authority 
(the powers, functions and associated obligations) as opposed to the 
legislative authority of the Overstrand Municipality. The executive authority 
of local government is primarily prescribed in section 156 read together with 
Schedules 4 and 5 of the Constitution, which together provide for three main 
types of powers, namely original powers, assigned powers and incidental 
powers.  
The precise scope and nature of these powers of local government have 
been canvassed in several vast texts focussing on local government law 
generally86 and environmental law and local government specifically.87 They 
have similarly formed the focus of several cases, dealing with a range of 
issues including municipal rates,88 municipal planning,89 the subdivision of 
                                            
86  For a comprehensive general overview of these powers, see: Steytler and De Visser 
Local Government Law, specifically: original powers (5-5, and 5-11 to 5-12), 
assigned powers (5-42 to 5-50), and incidental powers (5-6 to 5-9).  
87  For a comprehensive perspective of local authorities' powers and functions in the 
context of environmental governance, see Du Plessis Environmental Law and Local 
Government chs 2 and 11. 
88  City of Cape Town v Robertson 2005 2 SA 323 (CC). 
89  Minister of Local Government, Environmental Affairs and Development Planning, 
Western Cape v Habitat Council 2014 5 BCLR 591 (CC); Minister for Local 
Government Environmental Affairs and Development Planning, Western Cape v 
Clairison's CC 2013 6 SA 235 (SCA); Habitat Council v Minister of Local 
Government, Environmental Affairs & Development Planning, Western Cape 2013 6 
SA 113 (WCC); Minister of Local Government, Environmental Affairs and 
Development Planning, Western Cape v Lagoon Bay Lifestyle (Pty) Ltd 2014 1 SA 
521 (CC); Maccsand (Pty) Ltd v City of Cape Town 2012 4 SA 181 (CC); Minister of 
Mineral Resources v Swartland Municipality 2012 7 BCLR 712 (CC); Shelfplett 47 
(Pty) Ltd v MEC for Environmental Affairs and Development Planning, Western Cape 
2012 3 SA 441 (WCC); Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v Gauteng 
Development Tribunal 2010 6 SA 182 (CC); and Johannesburg Metropolitan 
Municipality v Gauteng Development Tribunal 2010 2 SA 554 (SCA). 
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land,90 liquor licences,91 water service provision,92 the management and use 
of rivers,93 sewage and solid waste,94 general environmental governance95 
and the certification of the Constitution itself.96 One particular recent case, 
namely Le Sueur v Ethekwini Municipality97 (hereafter the Le Sueur case) 
handed down by the Kwazulu-Natal High Court: Pietermaritzburg in 2013, 
triggered a flurry of journal articles focussing specifically on the powers of 
local government over environmental issues.98 Cumulatively, these 
academic tomes, cases and the academic commentary thereon provide 
valuable guidance on a broad range of issues relating to the powers 
harnessed by local government, relevant components of which will be drawn 
into the commentary below.  
An understanding of the form, nature and ambit of each of these different 
powers of local government, their associated responsibilities or duties, and 
their potential application to the scenario placed before the SCA in the 
Abbott matter, is key to understanding the potential shortcomings of the 
SCA's judgment. This commentary focusses on three such shortcomings. 
Firstly, the rather flippant manner in which the court dealt with the original 
power of local authorities over environmental matters, specifically relevant 
to managing estuaries. Secondly, the extent to which the court appears to 
have misconstrued the potential assigned powers of local authorities 
relevant to managing estuaries. Thirdly, the failure on the part of the court 
to consider the possible incidental power of local authorities to manage 
estuaries, predominantly the result of the very limited array of relevant 
environmental legislation canvassed by the court in its judgment.  
5.1 Flippant consideration of the original power of municipalities  
Municipalities have original executive authority in respect of and the right to 
administer the local government matters listed in Part B of Schedules 4 and 
                                            
90  Wary Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Stalwo (Pty) Ltd 2009 1 SA 337 (CC). 
91  Ex Parte President of the RSA: In re Constitutionality of the Liquor Bill 2000 1 SA 
732 (CC). 
92  Mazibuko v City of Johannesburg 2010 4 SA 1 (CC).  
93  Nel v Hessequa Local Municipality (WCC) (unreported) case number 12576/2013 of 
14 December 2015.  
94  Kenton on Sea Ratepayers Association vs Ndlambe Local Municipality (ECD) 
(unreported) case number 4341/2014 of 15 June 2016. 
95  Le Sueur v Ethekwini Municipality 2013 ZAKZPHC 6 (30 January 2013). 
96  Ex Parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly: In re Certification of the 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996 1996 4 SA 744 (CC).  
97  Le Sueur v Ethekwini Municipality 2013 ZAKZPHC 6 (30 January 2013) (the Le 
Sueur case). 
98  Bronstein 2015 SALJ 639-663; Muir 2015 SAPL 556-579; Humby 2014 PELJ 1660-
1689; and Freedman 2014 PELJ 567-594. 
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5 of the Constitution.99 From an environmental perspective, these matters 
include: air pollution; building regulations; municipal planning; pontoons and 
jetties; storm-water management; water and sanitation services; beaches; 
cleansing; the control of public nuisances; local amenities; municipal parks 
and recreation; noise pollution; public places; and refuse removal, refuse 
dumps and solid waste disposal. Municipalities are empowered to make and 
administer by-laws for the effective administration of the above matters that 
they have a right to administer.100  
Several key lessons can be drawn from recent relevant jurisprudence and 
academic commentary thereon regarding the original powers of local 
government.101 Firstly, they confirm the new model of governance under the 
Constitution,102 one comprising of three distinctive, interdependent and 
interrelated spheres of government (national, provincial and local 
government), with the Constitution distributing authority amongst the three 
spheres, granting each autonomy to exercise their respective authority while 
placing an obligation on them not to generally usurp the authority of another 
sphere.103 Secondly, the geographic scope of local government's original 
power relates mainly to matters that can be "appropriately regulated intra-
municipally, as opposed to intra-provincially"; in other words those matters 
which fall within the jurisdictional area of a municipality.104 Thirdly, the 
interpretation of the functional areas over which the three spheres exercise 
original executive authority must be guided by a "functional view of what [is] 
appropriate" to each sphere of government.105 Fourthly, given that the 
functional areas over which the three spheres of government exercise 
original authority (as reflected in Schedules 4 and 5 of the Constitution) are 
                                            
99  Section 156(1)(a) of the Constitution. 
100  Section 156(2) of the Constitution. 
101  See generally on the original powers of local government Steytler and De Visser 
Local Government Law; specifically, original powers (5-5, 5-11 to 5-12). See 
specifically on the original powers of local government in respect of environmental 
matters, Freedman 2014 PELJ 569-578. 
102  As expressly reflected in s 40 of the Constitution. 
103  Ex parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly: In re Certification of the 
Constitution of the RSA 1996 1996 4 SA 744 (CC) para 364; Ex parte President of 
the RSA: In re Constitutionality of the Liquor Bill 2000 1 SA 732 (CC) para 42; and 
Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v Gauteng Development Tribunal 2010 6 
SA 182 (CC) para 43. See further: Freedman 2014 PELJ 572.  
104  Ex parte President of the RSA: In re Constitutionality of the Liquor Bill 2000 1 SA 
732 (CC) para 53. See further Steytler and De Visser Local Government Law 5-19 
to 5-21; and Freedman 2014 PELJ 572-575. 
105  Ex parte President of the RSA: In re Constitutionality of the Liquor Bill 2000 1 SA 
732 (CC) para 51. See further Steytler and De Visser Local Government Law 5-19 
to 5-21. 
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not contained in "hermetically sealed compartments",106 overlaps may occur 
with the different spheres operating from their respective national, provincial 
and municipal perspective and applying their own constitutional and policy 
considerations when doing so.107 Where overlaps do arise, a bottom-up 
approach should be adopted to resolve them, with the court first determining 
what powers are vested in local government before proceeding to ascertain 
what powers are vested in provincial and national government 
respectively.108 Here I would add that any such determination would need 
to recognise that the structure of government "consists of a partnership"109 
among the three spheres of government, a partnership "oiled by the 
principles of co-operative government"110 that requires these spheres to 
"exercise their powers and functions in a manner that does not encroach on 
the geographical, functional or institutional integrity of government in 
another".111  
Furthermore, and as recent jurisprudence illustrates, environmental matters 
have been held to fall within the substantive scope of the functional areas 
over which local government authorities exercise original power, 
notwithstanding the fact that the functional area of the "environment" falls 
within Schedule 4A of the Constitution, functional areas of concurrent 
national and provincial competence. In the Le Sueur case112 the court 
concluded that local government has authority to pass by-laws that deal with 
the conservation and protection of the environment, in so far as these fall 
within their mandate over "municipal planning" reflected in Schedule 4B of 
the Constitution.113 In Nel v Hessequa Local Authority114 (hereafter the Nel 
case) the court upheld the validity of local government by-laws governing 
the management and use of rivers, given that rivers were public amenities, 
                                            
106  Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v Gauteng Development Tribunal 2010 6 
SA 182 (CC) para 55; and Maccsand (Pty) Ltd v City of Cape Town 2012 4 SA 181 
(CC) para 47. 
107  Wary Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Stalwo (Pty) Ltd 2009 1 SA 337 (CC) para 80. 
108  Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v Gauteng Development Tribunal 2010 6 
SA 182 (CC) paras 60-63; and Habitat Council v Provincial Minister of Local 
Government Environmental Affairs and Development Planning, Western Cape 2013 
6 SA 113 (WCC) para 120H-I. See further Steytler and De Visser Local Government 
Law 5-21 to 5-22; and Freedman 2014 PELJ 575.  
109  Doctors for Life International v Speaker of the National Assembly 2006 6 SA 416 
(CC) para 82. 
110  Maccsand (Pty) Ltd v City of Cape Town 2011 4 All SA 601 (SCA) para 11. 
111  Ex Parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly: In re Certification of the 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996 1996 4 SA 744 (CC) para 289. 
112  The Le Sueur case. 
113  Le Sueur case para 22. 
114  Nel v Hessequa Local Municipality (WCC) (unreported) case number 12576/2013 of 
14 December 2015 (the Nel case). 
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public places and places of recreation – all functional areas falling within 
Schedule 5B of the Constitution.115 
As support for their conclusions, the judges in the above two matters 
referred to a range of relevant provisions contained in the Constitution, the 
Local Government: Municipal Systems Act116 (hereafter the Municipal 
Systems Act) and the NEMA.117 Firstly, they highlighted the obligation 
imposed on the state (inclusive of local government) in terms of section 7(2) 
of the Constitution, "to respect, protect, promote and fulfil the rights in the 
Bill of Rights".118 These rights naturally included the environmental right, 
specifically section 24(2), which creates an obligation on all spheres of 
government to take reasonable legislative and other measures to prevent 
pollution and ecological degradation, promote conservation and secure 
ecologically sustainable development. Secondly, they specifically referred 
to section 152(1)(d) of the Constitution, which includes among the objects 
of local government, "promoting a safe and healthy environment".119 Finally, 
in the Nel case the judge made mention of the national environmental 
management principles reflected in section 2 of the NEMA, principles which 
apply to the actions of all organs of state, including municipalities.120 These 
principles must inter alia "serve as guidelines by reference to which any 
organ of state must exercise any function when taking any decision in terms 
of this Act or any statutory provision concerning the protection of the 
environment" and must "guide the interpretation, administration and 
implementation of this Act, and any other law concerned with the protection 
or management of the environment".121 Substantively, the principles include 
avoiding and/or minimising the disturbance of ecosystems and the loss of 
biological diversity, avoiding the degradation of the environment, and 
adopting a risk-averse and cautious approach where uncertainty is present. 
Were they so inclined, the courts could also have referred to the Municipal 
Systems Act to support their conclusion, which includes "promoting a safe 
and healthy environment", as one of the means through which local 
government exercises its legislative and executive authority.122 
                                            
115  Nel case para 11. 
116  Local Government: Municipal Systems Act 32 of 2000 (the Municipal Systems Act). 
117  In the judgments of both the Le Sueur case and the Nel case, the consideration of 
these laws appears to have been undertaken primarily in the context of interpreting 
local government's original powers, as opposed to their assigned or incidental 
powers.   
118  Le Sueur case para 19; and the Nel case para 12. 
119  Le Sueur case para 19; and the Nel case para 12. 
120  The Nel case para 12. 
121  Section 2(c) and (e) of NEMA. 
122  Section 11(3)(l) of the Municipal Systems Act.  
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It is acknowledged that these two cases clearly focussed on the legislative 
authority of local government. They do nonetheless appear to constitute 
precedent in the context of the executive authority of local government, 
given that the Constitutional provisions governing the legislative and 
executive authority of local government are to all intents and purposes 
identical. Furthermore, the critique by some commentators on the Le Sueur 
case particularly is acknowledged. This critique is varied and includes: 
concerns that perhaps the court went too far in its purported extension of 
the original powers of local government to include environmental matters at 
the local level; 123 apparent confusion about the basis or type of power on 
which the court sought to found such an extension;124 the continued lack of 
clarity about the precise substantive scope of any such extension;125 and 
the continued need for greater clarity in "delineating the boundaries of 
municipal, provincial and national powers under the Constitution".126 These 
two judgments nonetheless constitute relevant precedent relating to the 
scope and nature of local government's original power over environmental 
matters. 
Within this rich and complex context, it now seems prudent to reflect on how 
the SCA managed to dispense with the issue relating to the original power 
(and associated responsibility) of the Overstrand Municipality to manage the 
KRE and its impacts on riparian property in a mere paragraph of its 
judgment. According to the SCA, none of the functional areas listed in Part 
B of Schedules 4 and 5 confer any "authority" on local government to 
artificially breach the berm of the estuary and take measures to protect 
riparian property owners against flooding.127 According to the SCA, this 
conclusion was supported by the fact that the "environment" and "nature 
conservation" fell within Part A of Schedule 4, accordingly constituting 
matters of concurrent national and provincial competence as opposed to 
municipal competence.128 
This would appear to be a very superficial treatment of the relevant legal 
framework and contemporary jurisprudence relating to it, however. Several 
questions come to mind. Firstly, local government would appear to exercise 
original authority over several issues which span the management of 
estuaries. Take for instance their original authority over the following 
                                            
123  See further: Freedman 2014 PELJ 567-594. 
124  See further: Bronstein 2015 SALJ 663; and Humby 2014 PELJ 1680-1681. 
125  Freedman 2014 PELJ 592. 
126  Bronstein 2015 SALJ 663. 
127  Abbott (SCA) para 15. 
128  Abbott (SCA) para 15. 
A PATERSON  PER / PELJ 2018 (21)  23 
matters, all of which are reflected in Schedules 4B and 5B: beaches 
(through which the mouths of estuaries pass); pontoons and jetties (which 
are frequently erected on estuaries); storm-water and sewage (of which 
estuaries are frequently the recipients, given the absence of water-borne 
sewage systems in many rural areas); and municipal parks (which are often 
established adjacent to estuaries, given their ecological importance and the 
recreational opportunities they provide). Secondly, and following the same 
line of reasoning, does the Nel case not provide precedent for the argument 
that local government does have original power to manage estuaries, 
stemming from the fact that the estuary in question clearly constituted a 
public amenity, a public place and a place of recreation - all functional areas 
falling within Schedule 5B of the Constitution? Does the Le Sueur case 
similarly not provide precedent for the argument that local government does 
have original power to manage estuaries, to the extent that the conservation 
and protection of the environment fall within their mandate over "municipal 
planning", reflected in Schedule 4B of the Constitution? Thirdly, why did the 
SCA not deem it prudent to consider the relevant legal framework 
canvassed by the court in the Nel case and the Le Sueur case in reaching 
its conclusion regarding the original power of local government over 
environmental matters, specifically: section 7(2) read together with section 
24(2) of the Constitution; section 152(1)(d) of the Constitution; and section 
2 of the NEMA? To these I would add, as discussed above, section 11(3)(l) 
of the Municipal Systems Act. Fourthly, why did the SCA not deem it 
necessary to grapple with the characteristics of the model of government 
adopted by the Constitution, given the apparent overlapping original powers 
of the three spheres of government to manage estuaries? This model and 
the jurisprudence and academic commentary thereon recognises and 
tolerates potential overlap, promotes a functional and bottom-up approach 
to resolving overlaps, and recognises co-operative governance as a key to 
mitigating overlaps. The SCA did not address any of the above issues, 
seemingly regarding the original powers of national and provincial 
government over "environment" and "conservation" as "hermetically sealed 
compartments" secure from encroachment from local authorities. Had the 
SCA touched on the possibility of overlapping executive authority and drawn 
from the wealth of judicial and academic guidance on how to deal with such 
an overlap, it may well have come to the conclusion that the Overstrand 
Municipality did possess a significant degree of original authority (and 
associate responsibility) to manage the estuary and its impact on riparian 
properties. It may further have potentially come to the conclusion that this 
overlap did not pose a problem as the authority of the Overstrand 
Municipality would substantively and geographically focus on such 
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management from a purely local as opposed to a national and/or provincial 
perspective, a conclusion strengthened by the fact that the entire KRE falls 
within the jurisdictional boundary of the Overstrand Municipality.  
5.2 Misconstruing the assigned power of municipalities  
Turning to the second type of authority, namely the assigned powers of local 
government. Municipalities are accorded executive authority in respect of 
and the right to administer any function assigned to them in terms of national 
and provincial legislation.129 Executive powers and functions can be 
assigned to them by both the national and provincial spheres of 
government, subject to three conditions: the assignment must be in terms 
of an agreement concluded between the relevant Cabinet member (in the 
case of national government) or member of the Executive Council (in the 
case of provincial government) and the relevant Municipal Council; it must 
be consistent with the Act in terms of which the relevant power or function 
is exercised or performed; and it takes effect upon proclamation by the 
President (in the case of national government) or relevant Premier (in the 
case of provincial government).130 Giving effect to the subsidiary principle, 
the Constitution places an obligation on national and provincial government 
to assign the administration of such matters which necessarily relate to local 
government, if the matter would most effectively be administered locally and 
the municipality has the capacity to administer it.131 These assigned powers 
could accordingly relate to matters falling within the competence of national 
and provincial government, specifically those listed in Schedules 4A and 5A 
of the Constitution. Municipalities are empowered to make and administer 
by-laws for the effective administration of the above matters that have been 
assigned to them.132  
This overarching constitutional dispensation governing the assignment of 
executive powers and functions to local government needs to be read 
together with that prescribed in the Municipal Systems Act, specifically 
chapter 3 thereof.133 The Municipal Systems Act draws a distinction 
                                            
129  Section 156(1)(b) of the Constitution. See generally on the assigned executive 
powers of local government: Steytler and De Visser Local Government Law 5-42 to 
5-50; and DPLG Guideline Document on Provincial and Local Government Relations 
6-8.  
130  See the Constitution: s 99 (in relation to the assignment of executive authority from 
national government to local government); and s 126 (in relation to the assignment 
of executive authority from provincial government to local government). 
131  Section 156(4) of the Constitution. 
132  Section 156(2) of the Constitution. 
133  See generally DPLG Guideline Document on Provincial and Local Government 
Relations 6-8. 
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between two forms of assignments: general assignments (to all 
municipalities) and individual assignments (to specific municipalities). 
General assignments take place through legislation passed by national or 
provincial government, with the Municipal Systems Act prescribing 
procedures for necessary consultation and assessing the potential financial 
obligations imposed by such assignments prior to their enactment.134 
Individual assignments take place through agreements concluded between 
national or provincial government and specific municipalities, with the 
Municipal Systems Act again prescribing procedures for necessary 
consultation and assessing the potential financial obligations imposed by 
such assignments prior to any such agreement's being concluded.135  
What appears clear in the context of the Abbott case is that no individual 
assignment of executive power to manage the KRE to the Overstrand 
Municipality had taken place, given the absence of any specific agreement 
providing for such assignment. Accordingly, the SCA correctly sought to 
consider whether any general assignment in terms of national and/or 
provincial legislation had taken place. The decision of the SCA not to 
consider the Le Sueur and Nel cases and relevant academic commentary 
thereon cannot be faulted in this specific context, as both cases primarily 
grappled with the general assignment of legislative as opposed to executive 
powers to local authorities.136 What can be debated, however, is the very 
narrow array of legislation and policy canvassed by the SCA in coming to 
its conclusion that no such general assignment of executive power, as 
opposed to legislative power, had taken place of relevance to the KRE. In 
this regard, the SCA may well have benefitted from simply referring to the 
judgments in the Le Sueur and Nel cases, if only to distil a more 
comprehensive array of laws it should possibly have considered in 
undertaking this enquiry. In reaching its conclusion that the "authority of the 
municipalities at local government level to manage the environment at that 
level has always been and is still recognised",137 the court in the Le Sueur 
case considered the following laws: the environmental right and associated 
                                            
133  Section 156(2) of the Constitution. 
134  Section 9 of the Municipal Systems Act. 
135  Section 10 of the Municipal Systems Act. 
136  As has been highlighted by several commentators, perhaps the court in the Le Sueur 
case misconstrued its consideration of this legislation in the context of the assigned 
legislative powers of the local authority (Bronstein 2015 SALJ 661-663; and Humby 
2014 PELJ 1675). Notwithstanding this critique, a consideration of this legislation 
would appear to be of relevance in the context of determining the assigned executive 
powers and incidental powers of local government.  
137  Le Sueur case para 39. 
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relevant provisions in the Constitution;138 the NEMA;139 the NEMBA;140 the 
Local Government Transitions Act;141 the Development Facilitation Act;142 
the Municipal Systems Act;143 and the Land Use Planning Ordinance 
(Cape).144 Whilst being far more rigorous in its reflection on the relevant 
legal framework than the SCA in the Abbott case, the court in the Le Sueur 
case similarly appears to have really only just scratched the surface of the 
legal framework governing the powers and functions of the local sphere of 
government in environmental governance. The omissions are simply too 
numerous to repeat here, but a simple page through the recent and most 
comprehensive text on local environmental governance in South Africa, 
Environmental Law and Local Governance in South Africa145 published in 
2015 prior to the SCA's judgment, attests to this fact as it rigorously unpacks 
and analyses the role of local government across almost all environmental 
sectors. Reading this tome of almost 1000 pages can really lead a person 
to only one conclusion, namely that a vast swath of authority over matters 
of general environmental relevance, and of specific relevance to estuaries, 
                                            
138  Section 24 read together with s 8(1) of the Constitution, which effectively compels 
local government to take reasonable legislative and other measures to prevent 
pollution and ecological degradation, promote conservation and secure ecologically 
sustainable development. 
139  While the SCA did briefly consider the NEMA (specifically ch 5 dealing with 
integrated environmental management), it did not grapple with the national 
environmental management principles (s 2); the environmental implementation and 
management planning provisions (ss 11-16); private prosecution (s 33); and the 
Environmental Management Framework Regulations (GN R547 in GG 33306 of 18 
June 2010).  
140  Chapter 3 (Biodiversity Planning and Monitoring), specifically the National 
Biodiversity Framework (published in terms of s 38 in GN 813 in GG 32474 of 3 
August 2009); and s 48 (coordination and alignment of biodiversity plans). 
141  Item 21 of Schedule 2 (Metropolitan Councils) and Item 14 of Schedule 2A 
(Metropolitan Councils) of the Local Government Transitions Act 209 of 1993 that 
included "the coordination of environmental affairs" and the "management and 
control of environmental affairs" within their respective mandates. 
142  Section 31(c) and s 3(1)(h) of the Development Facilitation Act 67 of 1995 that 
required local authorities to encourage "environmentally sustainable land practices 
and processes" and promote the "sustainable protection of the environment" 
respectively. 
143  Section 23(c) of the Municipal Systems Act that places an obligation on 
municipalities in the context of integrated development planning to "contribute to the 
progressive realisation of the fundamental rights contained in Section 24 … of the 
Constitution"; and the Local Government, Municipal Planning and Performance 
Management Regulations (GN R796 in GG 22605 of 24 August 2001) that specify 
that spatial development frameworks included in an integrated development plan 
should contain a "strategic assessment of the environmental impact of the spatial 
development framework".  
144  The court in the Le Sueur case canvassed the extent to which town planning 
schemes adopted under the Ordinance sought to regulate land use, including the 
protection of the natural environment.  
145  Du Plessis Environmental Law and Local Government. 
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has been generally assigned to the local sphere of government by way of 
legislation. Take for instance the following two examples, drawn from the 
ECA and the NEMICMA. 
Firstly, section 31A of the ECA, which was strangely not considered by the 
judges in either the Le Sueur case or the Nel case, expressly enables a 
municipality to issue a directive to a person who "performs any activity or 
fails to perform any activity as a result of which the environment is or may 
be seriously damaged, endangered or detrimentally affected", compelling 
them to cease such an activity or take steps to eliminate, reduce or prevent 
the damage, danger or detrimental effect.146 It furthermore enables the 
municipality to "perform such activity or function as if he or it were that 
person and may authorise any person to take all steps required for that 
purpose" where the person to whom the directive is issued fails to comply 
with it.147 Does this not constitute a generally assigned executive power 
granted to municipalities to take measures to manage the environment 
generally, a power which would appear to be of direct potential relevance to 
the management of an estuary and the activities of riparian property 
owners? 
Secondly, while the SCA in the Abbott case did fleetingly acknowledge the 
executive authority generally assigned to local authorities under the 
NEMICMA in the broad context of coastal and estuarine management, it 
concluded that particularly the authority relating to estuaries constituted 
potential authority given that the implementation of the Act was still very 
much in its infancy.148 The SCA, however, did not appear to recognise and 
grapple with a number of the NEMICMA's provisions of relevance to the 
assignment of executive authority (and associated responsibility) to 
municipalities, all of which were very much in force at the time the matter 
was considered by the court. These included the provisions governing: the 
state's duty to fulfil environmental rights in the coastal environment;149 the 
state's public trusteeship of costal public property;150 measures affecting 
erosion and accretion relating to the seashore or coastal public property;151 
the designation of coastal access land;152 the establishment of municipal 
                                            
146  Section 31A(1) and (2) of the ECA. 
147  Section 31A(3) of the ECA. 
148  Abbott (SCA) para 21. 
149  Section 3 of the NEMICMA. 
150  Section 12 of the NEMICMA. 
151  Section 15 of the NEMICMA. 
152  Sections 18-20 of the NEMICMA. 
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coastal committees;153 municipal coastal management plans;154 coastal 
planning schemes;155 and the duty to avoid causing adverse effects on the 
coastal environment.156 A more thorough consideration of these provisions 
may well have led the SCA to conclude that executive authority over certain 
aspects relevant to managing the coastal zone, inclusive of the KRE, had in 
fact been assigned generally to the Overstrand Municipality in terms of the 
NEMICMA.  
5.3 Disregarding the incidental power of municipalities 
Even were the SCA to have thoroughly considered the original and possible 
assigned executive power of the local sphere of government of relevance 
to managing the KRE, and having done so ruled that none such existed, the 
court could and I would argue should have considered the possible 
relevance of the third source of executive authority of municipalities, namely 
incidental power. 
Section 156(5) of the Constitution accords a municipality a right to exercise 
any power "concerning a matter reasonably necessary for, or incidental to, 
the effective performance of its functions". Commentators have argued that 
this power should be accorded a broad, purposive interpretation.157 They 
further argue that two principles should guide the interpretation of the ambit 
of these incidental powers, namely that they "should be linked to local 
government's development mandate", and "should not be used to increase 
the functional ambit of local government's powers but rather to enhance the 
efficacy of administering an existing functional area".158 These incidental 
powers should accordingly be viewed and interpreted against the 
background of section 7(2) of the Constitution read together with the Bill of 
Rights, with section 24 (the Environmental Right) and section 152 (Objects 
of Local Government) again being of specific relevance here. Section 7(2) 
compels the state to "respect, protect, promote and fulfil the rights in the Bill 
of Rights". This would include promoting the environmental right, specifically 
section 24(2) thereof, which creates an obligation on all spheres of state, 
including local government, to take reasonable legislative and other 
                                            
153  Section 42 of the NEMICMA. 
154  Sections 48-50 of the NEMICMA. 
155  Sections 56-57 of the NEMICMA. 
156  Section 58 of the NEMICMA. 
157  Steytler and De Visser Local Government Law 5-6 to 5-8. The commentators cite Ex 
Parte Western Cape Provincial Government: In re DVB Behuising (Pty) Limited v 
North West Provincial Government 2000 4 BCLR 347 (CC) in support of this 
contention. 
158  Steytler and De Visser Local Government Law 5-8. 
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measures to prevent pollution and ecological degradation, promote 
conservation and secure ecological sustainable development. Furthermore, 
section 152(1)(d) includes among the objects of local government, 
"promoting a safe and healthy environment". Commentators argue that the 
latter component of the above object, namely promoting a "healthy 
environment", confirms that "development must take place in an 
environmentally sustainable manner", strengthening the argument for local 
government's incidental powers to extend over environmental matters.159 
Such an interpretation was clearly adopted in the Nel case and the Le Sueur 
case when interpreting the original and assigned power of local authorities, 
and there appears to be little reason why a similar interpretation could not 
be adopted in the context of local governments' incidental powers. 
According to Gyanda J in the Le Sueur case, "the environment is an ideal 
example of an area of … executive authority or power which had to reside 
in all three levels of government and, therefore, could not be inserted in 
Parts B of Schedules 4 and 5 and was instead inserted in Part A of Schedule 
4".160 Furthermore, Gyanda J expressly recognised that "although matters 
relating to the environment may be said, in terms of the Constitution, to be 
the primary concern or sphere of National and Provincial responsibility, 
Local Governments in the form of Municipalities are in the best position to 
know, understand, and deal with issues involving the environment at the 
local level".161 Concerns about overlapping executive authority would 
similarly not appear to be an issue here in the context of incidental powers, 
with the same approach distilled from relevant jurisprudence and academic 
commentary above in the context of original and assigned executive power 
seemingly applicable here. 
Why the court did not deem it appropriate and necessary to deal with the 
incidental executive authority of the Overstrand Municipality of relevance to 
the management of the KRE and its impacts on riparian properties is 
puzzling. Had it chosen to venture into such an enquiry and grappled with 
the relevant constitutional and legislative framework, jurisprudence and 
academic guidance previously canvassed in this commentary, it may well 
have come to a different conclusion. The management of the environment 
generally, and estuaries specifically, would appear clearly incidental to 
many of the functional areas delineated in the Constitution over which local 
authorities exercise original power and accordingly carry responsibility. 
                                            
159  Steytler and De Visser Local Government Law 5-9. 
160  Le Sueur case para 20. 
161  Le Sueur case para 20. 
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These could include: building regulations; municipal planning; pontoons and 
jetties; storm-water management; water and sanitation services; beaches; 
the control of public nuisances; local amenities; municipal parks and 
recreation; and public places. Accordingly, if such power did vest in the 
Overstrand Municipality, did it not similarly labour under some form of 
obligation to manage water levels in the estuary? If so, would the SCA in 
the Abbott case not then have been compelled to rule, using its own words 
when distilling the starting point of its enquiry, that "the municipality had the 
legal obligation (and the necessary power) to take steps to protect the 
appellant's house from flooding"?162 Finally, if it had so ruled, would the 
result of the matter have seen Mr Abbott's private proprietary interests 
(namely to protect his house from flooding) trumping the public ecological 
interests (to protect the ecological flow of the estuary against artificial 
breaching)? 
6 Conclusion 
The SCA's interpretation of the original, assigned and/or incidental powers 
of local government over the environment generally, and estuaries in 
particular, clearly indicates that there is some way to go in understanding 
the key role of local government in environmental governance, particularly 
where it's "environmental mandate" overlaps with that of the national and 
provincial spheres of government. The SCA's rather pithy examination of 
the relevant environmental legislation also illustrates that there remains 
significant scope for building a common, integrated and holistic 
understanding of the vast, complex and overlapping suite of laws introduced 
in the past two decades governing a wide variety of environmental issues, 
and the manner in which these laws distribute power and responsibility to 
the different spheres of government. 
Had the SCA ruled differently on the relevant power (and associated 
responsibility) of the Overstrand Municipality to manage the KRE, as I 
believe it ought to have, it would have accorded itself an opportunity to 
grapple in detail with all the components of South Africa's environmental 
legal framework relevant to the fundamental issue which appears to have 
lain at the heart of the dispute between Mr Abbott and the Overstrand 
Municipality, namely how to balance private proprietary interests and public 
environmental interests in the context of managing and maintaining the 
ecological flows of the estuary. This legal framework, inclusive of the laws 
of direct and indirect relevance to this balancing enquiry, was briefly 
                                            
162  Abbott (SCA) para 14. 
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canvassed in the introduction to this note and does not bear repeating here 
in its entirety. 
What does bear repeating, however, are the specific legal innovations 
introduced in the NWA and the NEMICMA of central relevance to informing 
this balancing act. In the broader context of fresh water resources 
(specifically the NWA), these would crucially include resource quality 
objectives, reserve determinations and catchment management strategies. 
In the narrower context of estuaries (specifically the NEMICMA), these 
would crucially include the national estuarine management protocol, 
estuarine management plans, coastal management programmes, coastal 
management lines, and the concept of state trusteeship over the coastal 
zone. 
It is here that the court may have faced a further challenge, having to 
determine which of these legal innovations reflected in the NWA and the 
NEMICMA were applicable and which not. One would forgive the court for 
assuming that the implementation of these relevant legal innovations would 
be at an advanced stage, if not complete, with the NWA and the NEMICMA 
having commenced some nineteen years and seven years ago 
respectively.163 Unfortunately, this would be a dangerous and erroneous 
assumption.  
There are innovations in the NWA of potential relevance to resolving the 
fundamental issue in the Abbott case. The Breede-Gouritz CMA, within 
whose WMA the KRE falls, was established only on 23 May 2014,164 rather 
bizarrely prior to the formal rationalisation of the country's initial nineteen 
WMAs into nine, which took place on 16 September 2016.165 No CMS has 
yet been adopted by the Breede-Gouritz CMA, although the Breede-
Overberg CMA, which was amalgamated with another to form the current 
CMA, had formally published a proposed CMS for its original WMA in 
2012.166 It was never finalised in the light of the amalgamation of the CMAs, 
which was initially proposed in 2012.167 No resource quality objectives or 
comprehensive reserve determinations have been adopted for the water 
resources situated within the Breede-Gouritz WMA. This state of affairs, 
unfortunately, is not unique to the KRE and in summary, the potential value 
                                            
163  The bulk of the NWA commenced on 1 October 1998. The bulk of the NEMICMA 
commenced on 1 December 2009. 
164  GN 412 in GG 37677 of 23 May 2014. 
165  GN 1056 in GG 40279 of 16 September 2016. 
166  GN 546 in GG 35517 of 20 July 2012.  
167  GN 547 in GG 35517 of 20 July 2012. 
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of these legal innovations of key relevance to managing the country's scarce 
water resources, inclusive of its estuaries, remains stagnant owing to the 
exceptionally tardy performance of the relevant water authorities in ensuring 
their timeous roll-out. 
Now it is necessary to turn to the relevant legal innovations in the 
NEMICMA. The National Estuarine Management Protocol was published in 
2013.168 While providing a broad vision, set of objectives and management 
standards, its key value lies in the details it provides on the form, nature and 
roll-out of estuarine management plans to be developed by a range of 
authorities for each of the country's 291 functional estuaries. 
Notwithstanding the fact that this guidance was provided almost four years 
ago, only one final169 and four draft170 estuarine management plans have 
been formally released to date, with none yet being formally adopted for the 
KRE.171 This troublesome state of implementation to a large extent similarly 
characterises the roll-out of the provincial coastal management plans, 
municipal coastal management plans and municipal coastal management 
lines. The National Coastal Management Programme was published in late 
2014. Only the Eastern Cape and Western Cape have formally released 
their provincial coastal management programmes - in 2014 and 2016 
respectively.172 As was confirmed in the latest version of the Overstrand 
Municipality's Integrated Development Plan, released in 2016, neither it nor 
the Overberg District Municipality has formally completed or adopted its 
municipal coastal management programmes.173 While several 
municipalities, inclusive of the Overberg District Municipality within whose 
boundaries the KRE falls, have released project reports relating to coastal 
management lines,174 only one municipality, namely Nelson Mandela Bay 
Municipality, has formally adopted a set of coastal management lines in 
                                            
168  GN 341 in GG 36432 of 10 May 2013.  
169  This is for the Nahoon Estuary (PN 41 in PG 3777 of 19 December 2016). 
170  These are for the Durban Bay and Orange River Mouth Estuary (GN 1034 in GG 
39347 of 30 October 2015); Breede River (PN 288 in PG 7653 of 20 July 2016); and 
Buffels and Swartlintjies Estuary (PN 41 in PG 2094 of 15 May 2017). 
171  While CapeNature published a Draft Situation Assessment Report: Development of 
an Estuarine Management Plan for the Klein River in 2007, a formal estuarine 
management plan is yet to be adopted for the estuary. 
172  Eastern Cape Costal Management Programme (PN 83 in PG 3150 of 26 March 
2014); and Western Cape Coastal Management Programme (PN 212 in PG 7620 of 
27 May 2016). 
173  Overstrand Municipality Integrated Development Plan 85-87, 206. A Final Situational 
Analysis Report informing the development of the Overberg District Municipality's 
Coastal Management Programme was released in 2015 (Overberg District 
Municipality T01/12-2013/13.  
174  Western Cape Department of Environmental Affairs and Development Planning 
Coastal Management (Set-Back) Lines for the Overberg District. 
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terms of the NEMICMA.175 In the absence of most of the specific planning 
innovations introduced by the NEMICMA, the armoury of most coastal 
provinces and municipalities, inclusive of the Overstrand Municipality, 
enabling them to fulfil their responsibility to act as trustees of the coastal 
zone seems significantly depleted. This responsibility would surely include 
seeking to balance private proprietary interests and public environmental 
interests when it comes to managing the natural flows of estuaries passing 
through the coastal zone, such as the KRE in the Abbott case. 
Without wanting to end on too negative a note, a depressing conclusion 
appears to emanate from the above very tardy track record of the relevant 
national, provincial and local spheres of government to implement most of 
the important legal innovations highlighted above. It is thus. Even were the 
SCA to have availed itself of the opportunity to grapple with the heart of the 
enquiry and dissected the vast, complex and overlapping relevant legislative 
framework, it would have been compelled to come to a decision in a virtual 
vacuum, owing to the continued absence of the bulk of the relevant legal 
innovations contained in the NWA and the NEMICMA of key relevance to 
managing South Africa's estuarine environment. Hopefully this tardiness will 
be remedied prior to a similar dispute canvassing local government's 
executive authority over estuaries coming before the judiciary again, 
although in the current era where legislative enactment as opposed to 
implementation appears to be the new vogue, or perhaps internal measure 
of government performance, this may be unlikely.  
Bibliography 
Literature 
Anchor Environmental Determination of the Ecological Water Requirements 
for the Klein Estuary 
Anchor Environmental Determination of the Ecological Water Requirements 
for the Klein Estuary - Report Prepared for the Breede-Gouritz Catchment 
Management Agency (Anchor Environmental Tokai 2015) 
Beck and Basson 2008 Water SA 
Beck JS and Basson GR "Klein River Estuary (South Africa): 2D Numerical 
Modelling of Estuary Breaching" 2008 Water SA 33-38 
Bronstein 2015 SALJ 
Bronstein V "Mapping Legislative and Executive Powers over 'Municipal 
                                            
175  PN 43 in PG 3777 of 19 December 2016. 
A PATERSON  PER / PELJ 2018 (21)  34 
Planning': Exploring the Boundaries of Local, Provincial and National 
Control" 2015 SALJ 639-663 
CapeNature and iRAP Consulting Development of an Estuarine 
Management Plan for the Klein River  
CapeNature and iRAP Consulting Development of an Estuarine 
Management Plan for the Klein River, Overberg Region, Western Cape - 
Draft Situation Assessment Report (CapeNature and iRAP Consulting Cape 
Town 2007) 
DPLG Guideline Document on Provincial and Local Government Relations 
Department of Provincial and Local Government Guideline Document on 
Provincial and Local Government Relations (The Department Pretoria date 
unknown) 
Driver et al National Biodiversity Assessment 
Driver A et al National Biodiversity Assessment 2011: An Assessment of 
South Africa's Biodiversity and Ecosystems - Synthesis Report (South 
African National Biodiversity Institute & Department of Environmental Affairs 
Pretoria 2012) 
Du Plessis Environmental Law and Local Government 
Du Plessis A (ed) Environmental Law and Local Government in South Africa 
(Juta Cape Town 2015) 
European Commission Ecological Flows 
European Commission Ecological Flows in the Implementation of the Water 
Framework Directive - Guidance Document No 31 (European Union 
Luxembourg 2015) 
Freedman 2014 PELJ 
Freedman W "The Legislative Authority of the Local Sphere of Government 
to Conserve and Protected the Environment: A Critical Analysis of Le Sueur 
v eThekwiwni Municipality [2013] ZAKZPHC (30 January 2013)" 2014 PELJ 
567-594 
Humby 2014 PELJ 
Humby T "Localising Environmental Governance: The Le Sueur Case" 2014 
PELJ 1660-1689 
Muir 2015 SAPL 
Muir A "The Le Sueur Case and a Local Government's Constitutional Right 
to Govern" 2015 SAPL 556-579 
A PATERSON  PER / PELJ 2018 (21)  35 
Overberg District Municipality T01/12-2013/13 
Overberg District Municipality T01/12-2013/13: Overberg Coastal 
Management Programme: Final Situation Analysis Report (dated June 
2015)) accessible at http://www.overstrand.gov.za/en/documents/strategic-
documents/environmental-management-services/coastal-management-
programme/2749-t01-12-2013-13-overberg-coastal-management-
programme-final-situation-analysis-report/file on 28 December 2017 
Overstrand Municipality Integrated Development Plan 
Overstrand Municipality Integrated Development Plan: 4th Review of 
2012/2017 Cycle (The Municipality Overstrand 25 May 2016) 
Steytler and De Visser Local Government Law 
Steytler N and De Visser J Local Government Law of South Africa Issue 9 
(Lexis Nexis Durban 2016) 
Turpie and Clark Development of a Conservation Plan for Temperate South 
African Estuaries  
Turpie J and Clark B Development of a Conservation Plan for Temperate 
South African Estuaries on the Basis of Biodiversity Importance, Ecosystem 
Health and Economic Costs and Benefits - Final Report - CAPE Regional 
Estuarine Management Programme (Anchor Environmental Cape Town 
2007) 
Western Cape Department of Environmental Affairs and Development 
Planning Coastal Management (Set-Back) Lines for the Overberg District 
Western Cape Department of Environmental Affairs and Development 
Planning Coastal Management (Set-Back) Lines for the Overberg District: 
Project Report (31 March 2015) accessible at 
https://www.westerncape.gov.za/eadp/sites/default/files/news/files/2015-
04-08/Overberg%20CML%20Final%20Report%20March%202015.pdf on 
28 December 2017 
Case law 
Abbott v Overstrand Municipality 2015 JOL 33188 (WCC) 
Abbott v Overstrand Municipality 2016 JOL 35969 (SCA) 
City of Cape Town v Robertson 2005 2 SA 323 (CC) 
City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v Gauteng Development 
Tribunal 2010 6 SA 182 (CC) 
A PATERSON  PER / PELJ 2018 (21)  36 
Doctors for Life International v Speaker of the National Assembly 2006 6 SA 
416 (CC) 
Ex Parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly: In re Certification of 
the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996 1996 4 SA 744 (CC) 
Ex Parte President of the RSA: In re Constitutionality of the Liquor Bill 2000 
1 SA 732 (CC) 
Ex Parte Western Cape Provincial Government: In re DVB Behuising (Pty) 
Limited v North West Provincial Government 2000 4 BCLR 347 (CC) 
Habitat Council v Minister of Local Government, Environmental Affairs & 
Development Planning, Western Cape 2013 6 SA 113 (WCC) 
Joh-Air (Pty) Ltd v Rudman 1980 2 SA 420 (T) 
Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v Gauteng Development Tribunal 
2010 2 SA 554 (SCA) 
Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v Gauteng Development Tribunal 
2010 6 SA 182 (CC) 
Kenton on Sea Ratepayers Association vs Ndlambe Local Municipality 
(ECD) (unreported) case number 4341/2014 of 15 June 2016 
Le Sueur v Ethekwini Municipality 2013 ZAKZPHC 6 (30 January 2013) 
Maccsand (Pty) Ltd v City of Cape Town 2011 4 All SA 601 (SCA) 
Maccsand (Pty) Ltd v City of Cape Town 2012 4 SA 181 (CC) 
Mazibuko v City of Johannesburg 2010 4 SA 1 (CC) 
Minister for Local Government Environmental Affairs and Development 
Planning, Western Cape v Clairison's CC 2013 6 SA 235 (SCA) 
Minister of Local Government, Environmental Affairs and Development 
Planning, Western Cape v Habitat Council 2014 5 BCLR 591 (CC) 
Minister of Local Government, Environmental Affairs and Development 
Planning, Western Cape v Lagoon Bay Lifestyle (Pty) Ltd 2014 1 SA 521 
(CC) 
Minister of Mineral Resources v Swartland Municipality 2012 7 BCLR 712 
A PATERSON  PER / PELJ 2018 (21)  37 
(CC) 
Nel v Hessequa Local Municipality (WCC) (unreported) case number 
12576/2013 of 14 December 2015 
Plascon-Evans Paints Ltd v Van Riebeeck Paints (Pty) Ltd 1984 3 SA 623 
(AD) 
Shelfplett 47 (Pty) Ltd v MEC for Environmental Affairs and Development 
Planning, Western Cape 2012 3 SA 441 (WCC) 
Wary Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Stalwo (Pty) Ltd 2009 1 SA 337 (CC) 
Wightman t/a JW Construction v Headfour (Pty) Ltd 2008 3 SA 371 (SCA) 
Legislation 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 
Environment Conservation Act 73 of 1989  
Development Facilitation Act 67 of 1995 
Local Government: Municipal Systems Act 32 of 2000 
Local Government Transitions Act 209 of 1993 
Marine Living Resources Act 18 of 1998  
National Environmental Management Act 108 of 1998 
National Environmental Management: Biodiversity Act 10 of 2004  
National Environmental Management: Integrated Coastal Management Act 
24 of 2008 
National Environmental Management: Protected Areas Act 57 of 2003 
National Water Act 36 of 1998 
Nature Conservation Ordinance (Cape) 19 of 1974 
Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000 
Sea-Shore Act 21 of 1935 
A PATERSON  PER / PELJ 2018 (21)  38 
Spatial Planning and Land Use Management Act 16 of 2013 
Western Cape Land Use Planning Act 3 of 2014 
Government publications 
GN R796 in GG 22605 of 24 August 2001 (Local Government, Municipal 
Planning and Performance Management Regulations) 
GN 813 in GG 32474 of 3 August 2009 (National Biodiversity Framework) 
GN R547 in GG 33306 of 18 June 2010 (Environmental Management 
Framework Regulations) 
GN 546 in GG 35517 of 20 July 2012 (Draft Catchment Management 
Strategy of the Breede-Overberg Catchment Management Agency) 
GN 341 in GG 36432 of 10 May 2013 (National Estuarine Management 
Protocol) 
PN 83 in PG 3150 of 26 March 2014 (Eastern Cape Costal Management 
Programme) 
GN 412 in GG 37677 of 23 May 2014 (Establishment of Breede-Gouritz 
Catchment Management Agency) 
Proc 5 in GG 39657 of 5 February 2015 
GN 1034 in GG 39347 of 30 October 2015 (Draft Durban Bay and Orange 
River Mouth Estuarine Management Plans) 
PN 212 in PG 7620 of 27 May 2016 (Western Cape Coastal Management 
Programme) 
PN 288 in PG 7653 of 20 July 2016 (Draft Breede River Estuarine 
Management Plan) 
GN 1056 in GG 40279 of 16 September 2016 (Rationalisation of South 
Africa's Water Management Areas) 
PN 41 in PG 3777 of 19 December 2016 (Nahoon Estuarine Management 
Plan) 
PN 43 in PG 3777 of 19 December 2016 (Nelson Mandela Bay Municipality 
Coastal Management Lines) 
A PATERSON  PER / PELJ 2018 (21)  39 
PN 41 in PG 2094 of 15 May 2017 (Draft Buffels and Swartlintjies Estuarine 
Management Plan) 
List of Abbreviations 
CMA Catchment management agency 
CMS Catchment management strategy 
DPLG Department of Provincial and Local Government 
ECA Environment Conservation Act 
KRE Klein River Estuary 
MLRA Marine Living Resources Act 
MSL Mean-Sea Level 
NCO (Cape) Nature Conservation Ordinance (Cape) 
NEMA National Environmental Management Act 
NEMBA National Environmental Management: Biodiversity 
Act 
NEMPAA National Environmental Management: Protected 
Areas Act 
NEMICMA National Environmental Management: Integrated 
Coastal Management Act 
NWA National Water Act 
PELJ Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal 
RQO Resource quality objectives 
SALJ South African Law Journal 
SAPL South African Public Law 
SPLUMA Spatial Planning and Land Use Management Act 
SCA Supreme Court of Appeal 
SSA Sea-Shore Act 
WCLUPA Western Cape Land Use Planning Act 
WMA Water management areas 
 
